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Proposition 1
Proposition 1: For c H − c L sufficiently small and α = 0.5 , there are no symmetric alternating focal price equilibria supporting p M H and p M L under high and low costs.
Proof: To prove this proposition, I first prove two lemmas.
Lemma 1: Suppose that R(p, c L ) and R(p, c H ) constitute an alternating focal price equilibrium supporting p M H and p M L . Then all p ∈ R(p M L , c H ) must be greater than or equal to p M L .
Proof: Suppose not. That is, suppose there exists p < p M L such that p ∈ R(p M L , c H ). It must be the case that
to ensure that a firm facing high costs would not strictly prefer to match p M L . (Note that since α = 0.5, W (p, c) is independent of the marginal costs in the previous period. Therefore, we drop the reference to c, and write the value function as W (p).)
Similarly, to ensure that upon observing p M L a firm facing low costs would rather set p M L than p, I require that
Conditions (4) and (5) combined imply that
which leads to a contradiction, since p < p M L and demand is downward sloping.
Lemma 2: Suppose that R(p, c L ) and R(p, c H ) constitute an alternating focal price equilibrium
Proof: The proof of Lemma 2 proceeds in 5 steps.
Step 1: First, I show that, for any p ∈ (p M L , p M H ), there does not exist ap > p such that p ∈ R(p, c) . To see this, suppose not and consider two cases. (a) Suppose c = c L . Then it must be that δW
Therefore the claim follows.
Step 2: It follows from lemma 1 and the fact that
Step 3: Next, we show that
that a firm is willing to set before dropping to p M L , and consider the following cases.
For a firm facing marginal cost c to prefer
where the right hand side represents the minimum payoffs from setting p M L . This condition can be rewritten as
This condition clearly does not hold for c H − c L small.
Case (2): Suppose that p * ∈ R(p * , c L ). Then it must be that
which implies
contradicting p M L being a best response to p M L when costs are low.
response can be shown to yield at most
Therefore, for p * to be preferred to p M L requires:
which is clearly violated for c H − c L not too large.
It follows from the arguments in cases (1)-(3), and from steps 1 and 2, that
Step 4: Next, I show that, if costs are low, in equilibrium a firm does not respond to p M H with
which contradicts p M L being a best response to p M L when costs are low.
Step 5: We can now prove Lemma 2. To see why a firm with low costs does not respond to
note that by the preceding steps, this would yield at most
compared with at least
Lemma 2 follows.
I can now use the above lemmas to prove Proposition 1. Suppose that p = p M H and c = c H .
Responding with p M H can be shown to yield
Alternatively, setting p M L yields at least
Recalling that
, a necessary condition for this deviation not to be optimal is therefore
which is clearly violated for c H − c L sufficiently small. QED.
Proposition 2
To prove Proposition 2, I first prove a simplified version, given as Proposition 2(a), in which the focal price is restricted to be the low cost monopoly price. I then prove that these strategies are also equilibria for prices on either side of the low cost monopoly price.
Proposition 2(a):
Suppose that p f = p M L , and that c H and c L satisfy
Then for δ sufficiently near 1 and k sufficiently near 0, the following strategies constitute an equilibrium:
Proof: The proof that for low k, high δ and c L and c H statisfying (i), (ii) and (iii), the specified strategies are an MPE proceeds in stages. In Stage 1, I define the parameters p
, and p L . In
Stage 2, given that these parameters exist I demonstrate that the specified strategies are an MPE under (i), (ii) and (iii), and for small k and high δ. In the third stage, I verify that the parameters
, and p L are well defined for k small, δ high, and c H − c L satisfying (i), (ii) and (iii). As well, In the third stage I demonstrate that Π(p H , c H ) > 0 and that as δ goes to zero, p H does not
Stage 1: p L is defined as the lowest price a firm would be willing to set before setting the focal price p f , when costs are c L , the rival's price is less than p f , and given that the firm's rival will respond by setting p f , regardless of marginal costs.
If the firm sets p f , its expected discounted future payoffs are equal to
If the firm sets a price p such that its rival restores the focal price next period with certainty, its expected future payoffs are
Writing
Next, p L is defined as the lowest price that a firm with low cost would set before dropping
Therefore, after some algebra, p L is defined according to
as the lowest price a firm facing high costs would set before restoring p f , if it knows that in all subsequent periods low cost firms will respond to all prices less than or equal to p H according to the reaction function specified above and high cost firms will respond with p f .
Formally, p H is defined as the lowest price such that
Finally, p H is defined as the lowest price a firm facing high costs would be willing to set before dropping down to p H , if it believes that all subsequent behavior is determined by the above dynamic reaction functions. Formally, p H is defined as the lowest price such that For each possible price set in the previous period and for each marginal cost level, it is sufficient to verify that a firm has no one-period deviation that yields a higher payoff than the strategies specified above. For simplification, the possible prices set by the firm's rival can be divided into different cases.
Suppose first that c = c L . A firm's possible deviations can be divided into several ranges.
(i) Responding with a price ≤ p L is not preferred by the definition of p L .
(ii) Responding with a price above p f yields δ 2 EΠ(p f , c)/2, which is strictly less than δEΠ(p f , c)/2, the payoff from raising price directly to p f . 
since otherwise a firm with high costs would rather set p H − k than restore the focal price, contradicting the definition of p H . Therefore, jumping above a rival's price to a price ∈ (p H , p
since the response of the rival will be p H . For this deviation not to be preferred it is sufficient to show that a firm would prefer to simply restore the focal price. This condition can be written as
which follows for δ near 1 by (i) and since
(v) Finally, that responding with a price ∈ (p H , p f ) is not preferred will follow when it is demonstrated that in response to p f , a firm facing high costs will not deviate to p f − k. This argument is deferred until Case 5.
for all p ≤ p L and the payoffs to all deviations above p are the same for high cost and low cost firms, it follows that a firm facing high costs would not deviate.
. 
The payoff from setting p
As 
All deviations except matching and setting p = p 
That this deviation is not optimal follows from the definitions of p L and p L and that Π(p
Next, consider p = p L + 3k. Using similar arguments, that a firm facing c L would not undercut by more than a grid size follows since p is less than p M L . After some manipulation, it can be shown that the firm will prefer p
From above we know that in response to p L + k and c = c L , matching is not preferred to setting
A sufficient condition for the firm not to match p L + 3k can then be written
Clearly, this is satisfied for k small. 
If it sets p H it earns
By the definition of p H the last two terms of the latter are greater than the last two terms of the former. As well, by the fact that demand is downward sloping, we know that
Therefore, this deviation cannot be preferred. By similar reasoning we can show that the low cost firm would not prefer to match p 
whereas setting p
Recall that from previous arguments and the definition of p H , V (p 
Again we know that V (p 
whereas setting p H + k yields
Recall that as k approaches zero, V (p
. Therefore for k small matching is not optimal.
Setting p H yields
Recall that as k decreases the payoffs from setting p L approach the payoffs of restoring the focal price, implying that
where Ω is positive and approaches zero as k decreases. Therefore, I require that there exists
Clearly, such a price exists for k sufficiently near zero.
where
It is sufficient therefore to show that
which is satisfied by condition (iii). 
Using the definition of p H , we can write
Therefore we need to show that there exists p ∈ (p H , p f ) such that
which is true for (δ, k) sufficiently near (1, 0), since demand is downward sloping.
Next we demonstrate that Π(p H , c H ) > 0. First note that after some manipulation, p H can be defined as the lowest price p such that
Therefore, to demonstrate that p H > c H it is sufficient to show that
since otherwise a firm facing p H −k and high costs would prefer to set p H −2k than p f , contradicting the definition of p H . After some manipulation this can be rewritten as
But by (i) and the fact that demand is downward sloping, the left hand side of this inequality is positive, yielding our result.
Finally, we demonstrate that as (δ, k) approach (1, 0), p H is bounded away from p f . From previous results we know that p H is the lowest price p satisfying
Therefore, p H is below the lowest price satisfying
which for k small is strictly below p f by (iii). (the other cases will follow from similar reasoning and will not be discussed here).
Sufficient condition (40) can be rewritten in this case as Therefore, since p H does not approach p f as δ approaches 1 and since demand is downward sloping, for p f sufficiently close to p M L and δ sufficiently close to 1,the deviation is not preferred.
